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Based on the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994), many studies have examined
whether or not physiological responses are “somatic markers” that implicitly guide the
decision making process. Vegetative or motor reactions that are produced by negative
or positive stimuli generate a series of somatic markers. So, when a similar stimuli is
encountered in the future, these somatic marks will facilitate favorable decisions and
inhibit the disadvantageous ones (Martínez-Selva et al., 2006). The most widely studied
physiological responses, as indicators of these markers, are heart rate and the skin
conductance response (Damasio, 1994; Bechara et al., 1996). The Iowa Gambling
Task (IGT) has been the most widely used tool in this research. The common IGT
protocol for psychophysiological studies comprises limited inter-trial intervals, and does
not distinguish participants as a function of relevant physiological traits, such as the
anticipatory skin conductance response (aSCR). The objectives of this work were to
determine whether “somatic markers” guide the decision making process without time
restrictions and to examine the effects of opposite aSCR profiles on this process.
Participants were 29 healthy subjects, divided into two groups according to positive
(+) and negative (−) aSCR. Two different data analysis strategies were applied: firstly,
gambling indices were computed and, secondly, we examined the parameters of
the probabilistic Prospect Valence Learning (PVL) model in three versions: maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE), PVL-Delta and PVL-Decay simulations with Hierarchical
Bayesian analysis (HBA) for parameter estimation. The results show a significant group
effect in gambling indices, with the aSCR+ group presenting lower risk in the decision
making process than the aSCR− group. Significant differences were also observed
in the Utility parameter of MLE-PVL, with the aSCR− group have low sensitivity to
feedback outcomes, than aSRC+ group. However, data from the PVL simulations do
not show significant group differences and, in both cases, the utility value denotes low
sensitivity to feedback outcomes.
Keywords: decision– making, iowa gambling task, prospect valence learning model, positive anticipatory skin
conductance, negative anticipatory skin conductance
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INTRODUCTION
Damasio (1994) attempted to explain through the somatic
marker hypothesis why patients with brain damage
(ventromedial prefrontal cortex) have poor social functioning,
despite achieving adequate scores on other cognitive processes,
as assessed by typical neuropsychological tests. This hypothesis
argues that decisions are not only determined by rational
processes, but also by emotional ones. Thus, a deficit in decision
making might be due to difficulties in properly using emotional
information from body signals. These body signals, that Damasio
called “somatic markers”, would allow regulating or guiding
actions toward “good” decisions and they are particularly
important in situations of uncertainty, where the exact result of
a decision is not known in advance, such as deck selection in the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT).
Vegetative or motor reactions that are produced by
negative or positive stimuli generate a series of somatic
markers. So, when a similar stimulus is encountered in
the future, these somatic marks will facilitate favorable
decisions and inhibit the disadvantageous ones (Martínez-
Selva et al., 2006). The most widely studied physiological
responses, as indicators of these markers, are heart rate
and the skin conductance response (Damasio, 1994;
Bechara et al., 1996).
The IGT, designed by Bechara et al. (1994), has been
consolidated as an assessment instrument of decision making
processes under uncertainty. This task consists of four decks of
cards (ABCD), with different gains and losses that the subject
discovers across the trials. The aim of the “game” is to win as
much money as possible, but participants are not informed that
there is a hidden strategy. This strategy involves the presence
of two advantageous decks (with long-term gains, but each
card has a gain or a loss of a smaller magnitude) and two
disadvantageous decks (with long-term losses, but each card has
a gain or loss of a greater magnitude). The authors propose that
decision making can be assessed by computing the Gambling
Index (GI), which is calculated by subtracting the choices of
the advantageous decks from the disadvantageous ones, that is,
GI = (C+D)−(A+B).
The first set of studies based on this task revealed differences
between brain-damaged patients and healthy adults, in the
sense that healthy people made fewer unfavorable decisions,
associated with higher skin conductance in the disadvantageous
decks. This was interpreted in the sense that somatic signals
intervene in healthy subjects to guide the process of decision
making and favor the advantageous decks. On the contrary,
higher skin conductance was not observed before choosing
the disadvantageous decks in people with brain lesions,
indicating the absence of somatic markers that guide the
decision making process and leading to worse outcomes on
the IGT (Bechara et al., 1996, 1997; Tomb et al., 2002;
Carter and Pasqualini, 2004).
In later studies, it has been observed that healthy subjects
may also differ in their anticipatory responses, as these may
be more or less intense. The “high risk-takers” are defined as
having minor anticipatory responses and a poorer performance
on the IGT. It is argued that their low physiological responses
do not allow the development of appropriate somatic markers
(Bechara and Damasio, 2002). However, many questions remain
to be solved because various studies report inconclusive
results. Differences in physiological responses were not found
in all cases: only in individuals with good performance on
the IGT (Crone et al., 2004), only in the last moves of
the task (Akiyama and Hasegawa, 2014), or only in some
decks (Jenkinson et al., 2008). Some researchers rejected the
thesis that decision making is guided by somatic markers
or emotions (e.g., Maia and McClelland, 2004; Evans et al.,
2005), whereas other studies cast doubts on the ecological
validity of the IGT (Steingroever et al., 2013). In any case, the
inconsistencies in the literature may be due, at least in part, to
methodological artifacts.
Concerning the administration time of the task, studies
measuring skin conductance responses (SCR) during IGT
stipulate inter-trial intervals (ITI) from 7 to 10 s, so finishing
the game involves approximately 17 min (Bechara et al., 1996;
Bechara and Damasio, 2002; Carter and Pasqualini, 2004; Crone
et al., 2004; Jenkinson et al., 2008; Starcke et al., 2009; Fonfría
et al., 2015; Ottaviani and Vandone, 2015). However, some studies
focused solely on behavioral measures (i.e., no physiological
records) in a variety of healthy and clinical samples have not
established fixed intervals between the cards, making the IGT
a less tedious and more dynamic task (Bechara et al., 1994;
Sevy et al., 2007; Buelow and Suhr, 2009; Fridberg et al., 2010;
Alameda-Bailén et al., 2014). Considering that both types of
studies obtain similar results and are framed within the somatic
marker hypothesis, we think that these markers must appear in
short temporal intervals controlled by the experimenter, but that
it is also important to examine the performance of physiological
indices in a more natural process of decision making without
time constraints.
In addition, while recording skin conductance provides
information about whether emotions play a role in the
decision making process, it specifically does not allow us to
determine individual sensitivity to the frequency or magnitude
of reinforcements and punishments (Bull et al., 2015). Therefore,
performance on the IGT can be analyzed by computational
probabilistic models, such as (PVL, Ahn et al., 2008, 2011,
2014), complementarily to the Gambling Index. This model,
based on Bayesian logic, is based on three general assumptions
(Ahn et al., 2008):
– the evaluation of the positive/negative results can be
represented by a one-dimensional utility function.
– expectancies about each deck are learned by what is
experienced in each trial.
– these expectancies determine the choice probabilities of
each deck on each trial.
The PVL model has been applied to different clinical
samples and has allowed the identification of distinct decision-
making patterns in the IGT (Ahn et al., 2008, 2011, 2014;
Alameda-Bailén et al., 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018).
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Ultimately, the aim of this study is to investigate whether
higher SCR before card selection from disadvantageous decks
is associated with better results in the task, and vice versa,
with no restrictions concerning maximum response times,
as a means to make the decision-making process more
natural. In fact, following Bechara et al. (1997), we forced
a minimum interval of 1 s before the selection of each
card. We also intended to compare the performance patterns
of participants with higher and lower SCRs in anticipation
of choosing cards from disadvantageous decks using PVL
parameters, and to observe possible group differences. In order
to better characterize their decision-making styles, we applied
the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), and PVL-Delta
and PVL-Decay simulations with Hierarchical Bayesian analysis
(HBA) for parameter estimation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-nine young adults (22 women), aged between 18 and
35 (M = 22.31, SD = 4.34) participated voluntarily in the study.
Participants were recruited among students of the University
of Huelva and did not receive any compensation for their
participation. We do not keep any personal information of the
participants, and we only record their gender and age. This study
was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki
and the recommendations of the Bioethics Committee Guidelines
of the University of Huelva, following the protocols established
by the university and the Portal of Ethics of Biomedical Research
of Andalusia (Portal de Ética de la Investigación Biomédica de
Andalucía: PEIBA), although, ethical approval was not required
in line with national legislation and institutional guidelines. All
subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
After performing the task, participants were further divided
into two groups, according to their anticipatory SCR: (a)
the aSCR− group comprised 14 participants (9 women),
with an average age of 21.43 (SD = 3.65) and a baseline
mean SCR of 4.82 µS (SD = 3.25); (b) in the aSCR+
group, there were 15 participants (13 women), with an
average age of 23.13 (SD = 4.88) and a baseline mean SCR
of 6.66 µS (SD = 4.46). In order to compute individual
aSCR values, skin conductance preceding each card (1250 ms
time-window) was averaged, and the inverse GI formula
was applied (Carter and Pasqualini, 2004), that is, SCR in
anticipation of disadvantageous choices (A+B) minus the
responses to advantageous choices (C+D): aSCR (A+B) –
aSCR (C+D). Results of this formula are either positive
or negative, with positive aSCR values representing higher
conductance responses in anticipation of disadvantageous decks,
and negative values meaning higher responses in anticipation of
advantageous decks.
No significant group differences were observed for age,
t(27) = −1.06, p = 0.299, sex, χ2 = 1.98, p = 0.159, and skin
conductance during the period of no stimulation (baseline),
t(27) =−1.26, p = 0.217.
TASK
We used the Cartas software (Palacios et al., 2010), a
computerized version of Bechara et al. (1994) IGT, “ABCD”
version. The task consists of presenting four decks of cards (A,
B, C, and D), from which the subject must choose one card in
every trial for a total of 100 choices. Each deck has a total of 40
cards displaying a certain gain or loss. The participant starts with
the amount of €2000, displayed on the screen, which is updated
with the gains or losses after each trial.
For every 10 cards selected from the disadvantageous decks
(A and B), the subject loses a total of €250. In deck A, gains are
always €100, but losses range between €150 − 350 in 5 out of 10
elections, whereas in deck B, there is a single loss of €1250 for
each cycle of 10 cards.
For every 10 cards selected from the advantageous decks (C
and D), participants gain €250. Losses in deck C range between
€25 – 75, whereas in deck D, there is a single loss of €250,
occurring once every 10 cards. The aim for participants is to
win as much money as possible, although the best strategy is
concealed when giving the instructions.
After selecting one card, participants had to wait at least 1 s
before choosing the next one, but they had no time limit for
their responses.
Procedures
Data gathering sessions were performed individually, with an
approximate duration of 45 min, in a room with adequate
lighting and acoustics. All participants were informed about
the objectives of the study and gave informed consent before
starting the experiment.
Afterward, the participant was seated comfortably in front
of a computer and prepared for physiological recording. Skin
conductance (SC) was measured using MC-6SY cable and
compatible electrodes (range 5–100 µS) connected to an I-330-
C2+ 12-channel polygraph, synchronized with USE3 Physiolab
data processing software (all from J & J Engineering, Inc.,
Washington, DC, United States).
Electrodes were placed on the middle phalanges of the
index and middle finger of the non-dominant hand (JE-26 gel
was employed). Participants were instructed not to move the
hand and to remain silent during the experiment. A baseline
acquisition (1 min) was performed before starting the IGT, and
the SC recording was run simultaneously with the task thereafter.
Markers were manually inserted in the recordings each time
participants selected a card.
In order to examine the decision-making processes, measures
from two analytical procedures were computed. Firstly, we
obtained the GI, as described above, and other classical IGT
measures. Partial GIs were also calculated for blocks of 20 trials
each, that is: B1 (cards 1–20), B2 (cards 21–40), B3 (cards 41–
60), B4 (cards 61–80), and B5 (81–100). Thus, we analyzed the
following measures: total GI, partial GIs, number of choices
per deck (ABCD) and number of choices per type of deck
(advantageous vs. disadvantageous). Secondly, we determined the
following PVL parameters: utility, loss aversion, recency, and
consistency (see Table 1).
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TABLE 1 | Summary of prospect valence learning model (PVL).
Interval of values
Parameter Maximum likelihood Decay Rule Delta Rule Minimum value Maximum value
Utility (α) 0 < α < 1 0 < α < 2 Sensitivity to feedback outcomes
Lower Higher
Loss aversion (λ) 0 < λ < 5 0 < λ < 10 Sensitivity to losses relative to gains
Higher Lower
0 < A < 1
Recency (A) Decay Rule Decay Rate Learning Rate Recent outcomes Past outcomes
Consistency (c) 0 < c < 5 Random Deterministic
The equations to calculate the parameters of PVL are:
To rate a card:
u(t) =
{
x(t)xa → if X(t) ≥ 0
−λ |x(t)|α → if X(t) < 0
(1)
where:
α = Utility or Reward sensitivity. This regulates the shape
of the utility (power) function. High values of α indicate more
sensitive to feedback outcomes, whereas low values of α indicate
low sensitivity to feedback outcomes.
λ = Loss aversion. This determines sensitivity to losses
compared to gains. A value of λ less than 1 indicates more
sensitivity to gains than to losses whereas a value of λ greater than
1 indicates more sensitivity to losses than to gains.
To create deck expectancy, E, for deck j on trial t, the equation
for decay-reinforcement rule is:
Ej (t) = A · Ej (t−1)+ δj (t) · u (t) (2)
and the equation for delta rule is:
Ej (t) = Ej (t − 1)+ Aδj (t) .[u (t)− Ej (t − 1)] (3)
Where j refers to deck A, B, C, or D. δj(t) is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if deck j was chosen on trial t, and otherwise is 0. A is
the recency or learning rate parameter.
A = Recency parameter/learning rate. In PVL-Delta the
expected value is updated with a learning rate parameter and a
prediction error term. Where A close to 1 places more weight
on recent outcomes, and where A close to 0 places more
weight on past outcomes. The difference between predicted
and experienced outcomes is the prediction error. In PVL-
Decay A is used for value updating. The recency parameter
indicates how much the expected values of all decks are
discounted on each trial.
In the delta rule (Rescorla–Wagner rule, Rescorla and Wagner,
1972), only the expectancy of the selected deck is updated
while the expectancies of other decks remain unchanged.
In the decay rule (Erev and Roth, 1998), A is used for
value updating. It indicates how much the expected values
of all decks are discounted on each trial. The decay rule
permits the expectancies of all the alternatives to change
on each trial, thus is more flexible than the delta rule but
high model flexibility may over-fit the data and lead to
poor generalizability.
The equation to calculate the probability of choosing Deck j is:
Pr
[






and, finally, to calculate the consistency between choices and
expectancies, the equation is:
θ(t) = 3c − 1 (5)
where: c = Consistency or Response Sensitivity. This is
a consistency parameter (choice sensitivity), it reflects how
deterministically individual choices are made in relation to
alternative choices. High values represent more deterministic
choices and low values random choices.
We applied the (MLE, Ahn et al., 2008), and PVL-Delta
and PVL-Decay simulations with HBA for parameter estimation
(Ahn et al., 2008, 2014, 2016).
The MLE has been performed with the decay rule (Erev and
Roth, 1998), as it consistently shows better models of post hoc
fit than the delta rule in the IGT (Yechiam et al., 2005). For
the MLE estimation of PVL parameters we follow a scrip in R
programmed by Ahn et al. (2008).
Hierarchical bayesian analysis simulation method uses the
parameters estimated from the IGT task as seed to make
predictions. It is not an individual level analysis. To perform
HBA, we used a R packages hBayesDM (Ahn et al., 2016) and
RStan (Stan Development Team, 2014), which uses Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling Hamiltonian Monte Carlo
(HMC) algorithms, that allows efficient sampling for complex
models and with highly correlated parameters. The individual
parameters were obtained from the normal distributions at the





you can see the commands used for both HBA simulations:
PVL-Delta and PVL-Decay. The HBA simulations were
performed based on of each group data, thus, we performed
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for the aSCR− group the corresponding HBA simulations
(PVL-Delta and PVL-Decay), and equally, the HBA simulation,
PVL-Delta and PVL-Decay, for aSCR+ group (using the
procedure in Appendix B of Ahn et al., 2008).
Statistical analyses comprised: (a) t-test for independent
samples to examine possible group differences in decision
making (aSCR+ vs. aSCR−) in the total test (GI); (b) repeated
measures ANOVA followed by planned contrasts to analyze
group differences in partial GIs (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5) to observe
task evolution across the blocks; (c) repeated measures ANOVA
followed by planned comparisons of groups (aSCR+ vs. aSCR−)
to examine differences in the number of choices depending
on the deck type (advantageous vs. disadvantageous) and deck
(A, B, C, D); (d) Student’s t-test for independent samples
on PVL parameters; (e) repeated measures ANOVA of SRC
activation (anticipatory/post-election) by bloks, for the positive
(aSCR+) and negative (aSCR−) anticipatory skin conductance
response groups for advantageous and disadvantageous desk;
and (f) repeated measures ANOVA of the deck choice times
by block for the positive (aSCR+) and negative (aSCR−)
anticipatory skin conductance response groups for advantageous
and disadvantageous deck (see Supplementary Data Sheet S1).
RESULTS
The results showed significant differences between the aSCR+
group (M = 12.00, SD = 18.99) and the aSCR− group
(M = −2.29, SD = 13.38) for total GI, t(27) = −2.33, p = 0.028,
d = 0.41. Concerning the partial GIs, the results show a group
effect, F(1,27) = 5.58, p = 0.026, η2 = 0.17, with the planned
contrast analyses revealing significant differences in block B2,
t(20.4) = −2.42, p = 0.025, d = 0.47, and a marginally significant
difference in B3, t(27) = −1.98, p = 0.058), d = 0.36, with
higher partial GI scores for the aSCR+ group in both cases
(see Figure 1).
Regarding the effects of group (aSCR+, aSCR−) and deck type
(advantageous, disadvantageous) on the number of choices, the
repeated measures ANOVA did not show any main effect (F < 1)
but we found a significant interaction effect of Group∗Type of
Deck, F(1, 27) = 5.41, p = 0.028, η2 = 0.17. Specifically, whereas
the aSCR+ group chose more cards from the advantageous decks
(M = 56.00, SD = 9.49) than from the disadvantageous ones
(M = 44.00, SD = 9.49, p = 0.009) the aCSR- group chose similarly
from both types of decks, with a non-significant tendency
(p > 0.05) to select more cards from the disadvantageous
decks (M = 51.14, SD = 6.69) over the advantageous ones
(M = 48.86, SD = 6.69).
Planned comparisons revealed significant group differences
both for the advantageous and disadvantageous decks,
t(27) =−2.33, p = 0.028, d = 0.41.
In a further analysis of the effects of group (aSCR+, aSCR−)
and deck (A, B, C, D) on the number of choices, the repeated
measures ANOVA yielded a main effect of deck, F(3, 81) = 25.27,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.48, and a marginal interaction effect was also
obtained, F(3, 81) = 2.58, p = 0.059, η2 = 0.08. Post hoc analyses
within the aSCR− group revealed significant differences between
decks A–B (p < 0.01), A–D (p < 0.05), and B–C (p < 0.05),
whereas the aSCR+ Group showed differences between decks
A–B (p < 0.01), A–C (p < 0.01), and A–D (p < 0.001).
Planned comparisons revealed a significant group difference
only for deck A, t(27) = 3.19, p = 0.004, d = 0.59, which was more
frequently selected by the aCSR- group (see Figure 2).
Regarding to the parameters of the PVL model, as can be
seen in Table 2, there were no significant differences between
aSCR− and aSCR+, in PVL-decay and PVL-delta simulations,
the parameter utility (α: t = 2.432, p = 0.006) presented significant
differences using MLE.
We have analyzed the anticipatory and post-election SCR
activation by block for the positive (aSCR+) and negative
(aSCR−) anticipatory skin conductance response groups
for advantageous and disadvantageous desk (Figures 3, 4
and Table 3).
We can see how the activation levels of the aSRC+ group are
higher than those of the aSRC− group, however, the activation
levels between advantageous and disadvantageous choices are
FIGURE 1 | Means of the Gambling Index by block for the positive (aSCR+) and negative (aSCR–) anticipatory skin conductance response groups (error bars
represent standard error of the mean).
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FIGURE 2 | Number of deck selections (ABCD) for the positive (aSCR+) and negative (aSCR–) anticipatory skin conductance response groups (error bars represent
standard error of the mean), for total task (A) and by blocks (B) for (aSCR– and C for aSRC+).
TABLE 2 | Descriptive and statistical analysis of the PVL parameters.
MLE: PVL HBA: PVL-Decay HBA: PVL-Delta
aSCR− aSCR+ aSCR− aSCR+ aSCR− aSCR+
M (SD) M (SD) Sig. M (SD) M (SD) Sig. M (SD) M (SD) Sig.
A 0.495 (0.31) 0.458 (0.32) 0.918 (0.05) 0.919 (0.05) 0.093 (0.06) 0.092 (0.06)
α 0.557 (0.41) 0.165 (0.26) 0.006 0.529 (0.26) 0.534 (0.25) 0.680 (0.21) 0.681 (0.21)
c 0.365 (0.36) 0.998 (1.16) 0.430 (0.98) 0.431 (0.98) 2.008 (0.68) 2.010 (0.68)
λ 3.00 (2.17) 2.57 (2.22) 1.369 (0.53) 1.358 (0.52) 1.001 (0.40) 1.001 (0.39)
A (recency); α (utility); c (consistency), and λ (loss aversion).
similar in both groups. Also note that there are no differences
between anticipatory and post-election activation. Perhaps it
should be noted that while we can observe a downward trend in
the aSCR+ group in the aSCR− group is upward.
The analysis of variance of repeated measures does
not show significant effects of any main effect. Two
interactions are significant, those obtained between SCR
(anticipatory/post-election) and group (aSCR+/aSCR−)
F(2,24) = 9.348; p = 0.005, and between SCR
(anticipatory/post-election) and blocks [F(4,24) = 3.065;
p = 0.036]. In the first interaction, we observe that there
are no significant differences between anticipatory and post-
election activation in the aSCR− group, while in the aSRC+
group if there are significant differences, anticipatory activation
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FIGURE 3 | Means of the anticipatory SCR activatión by block for the positive
(aSCR+) and negative (aSCR–) anticipatory skin conductance response
groups for advantageous and disadvantageous desk (error bars represent
standard error of the mean).
FIGURE 4 | Means of the post-election SCR activation by block for the
positive (aSCR+) and negative (aSCR–) anticipatory skin conductance
response groups for advantageous and disadvantageous desk (error bars
represent standard error of the mean).
is slightly higher (p = 0.004). As for the relationship between
the activation (anticipatory/post-election) along the blocks we
obtain slightly lower levels in the post-election activation and in
both cases (anticipatory and post-election activation) there is a
slight downward trend.
Finally, in relation to response times, we have analyzed
the deck choice times by block for the positive (aSCR+)
and negative (aSCR−) anticipatory skin conductance response
groups for advantageous and disadvantageous deck (Figure 5
and Table 4). We can observe, both groups present descending
election times, especially between the first and the second
block. The aSRC+ group has the lowest response times in the
advantageous elections.
The analysis of variance of repeated measures shows us only
one main effect in the task blocks [F(4.24) = 9.049; p = 0.000]
confirming the observed downward trend, especially between the
initial blocks (B1 and B2) and the rest.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to determine whether healthy
community-dwelling individuals would manifest a significantly
distinct behavioral pattern in the IGT based on their SCRs prior
to card selection, with the novelty that we did not establish a
limited time interval between trials as a means to enhance the
ecological validity of the task. Also, participants’ decisions were
analyzed both with classical methods and a computational model.
Taken altogether, our results suggest that participants with
higher anticipatory SCRs to the disadvantageous decks (aSCR+)
perform better in the IGT than participants not showing such
anticipatory responses (aSCR−). These results are similar to
previous studies that apply limited time intervals between trials
(Bechara et al., 1996, 1997, 2002; Bechara and Damasio, 2002;
Carter and Pasqualini, 2004; Crone et al., 2004; Jenkinson et al.,
2008; Starcke et al., 2009; Fonfría et al., 2015; Ottaviani and
Vandone, 2015), suggesting that free time to deliberate responses
does not change the decision-making process.
More important, it must be noted that the total GI of
the aSCR− group, despite being healthy, is below the cut-
off score (10) established by Bechara et al. (2001, 2002) and
Bechara and Damasio (2002) for impaired decision making, and
other studies have confirmed this criterion in different types of
patients (Alameda et al., 2012; Cavedini et al., 2012). Although
some studies have shown that different factors may explain this
variability in healthy population, such as age (Denburg et al.,
2009), level of education (Davis et al., 2008), gender (De Visser
et al., 2010), certain personality characteristics (Glicksohn and
Zilberman, 2010), anxiety (Fonfría et al., 2015), and the time or
number of movements (Bull et al., 2015), our results reveal that
special care must be taken regarding galvanic response profiles
when selecting participants for control groups.
In addition, our results are consistent with the idea that the
initial phase of the IGT is used to explore and learn how the
task works (Damasio, 1994; Dunn et al., 2006). The aSCR+
and aSCR− groups start choosing differently only in the second
block, indicating that participants with higher prior activation
to the disadvantageous decks determine a better strategy in the
decision process, resulting in a better performance in the IGT.
The performance of the aSCR− group also improved across the
task, with both groups behaving similarly in the last blocks, but
at a different learning rate. Therefore, aSCR− participants may
need more time to develop the appropriate strategy, as suggested
by Bull et al. (2015) or Marin et al. (2019), they suggest that
low SCR is related with hypoactivation of brain regions involved
in fear learning. This being said, it would be interesting to see
whether the group differences found would definitely disappear
by extending the duration of the task.
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TABLE 3 | Mean and S.D. of anticipatory and post-election SCR activation for advantageous and disadvantageous decks by blocks.
Anticipatory SCR Post-election SCR
Advantageous (C + D) Disadvantageous (A + B) Advantageous (C + D) Disadvantageous (A + B)
SCR- SCR+ SCR- SCR+ SCR- SCR+ SCR- SCR+
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
B1 6.821 3.914 9.263 7.629 6.880 3.910 9.314 7.714 6.820 3.904 9.235 7.562 6.888 3.897 9.301 7.684
B2 6.902 3.903 8.806 7.489 6.860 3.896 8.388 7.639 6.887 3.888 8.793 7.511 6.875 3.911 8.382 7.674
B3 6.942 3.926 8.591 7.521 6.930 3.912 8.638 7.476 6.943 3.934 8.581 7.502 6.930 3.905 8.635 7.490
B4 7.047 3.981 8.607 7.742 6.996 3.936 8.611 7.750 7.057 3.979 8.625 7.769 7.005 3.938 8.602 7.758
B5 7.162 4.073 8.634 8.357 7.192 4.105 8.626 8.529 7.174 4.087 8.610 8.319 7.185 4.097 8.637 8.550
FIGURE 5 | Means of the deck choice times by block for the positive (aSCR+) and negative (aSCR–) anticipatory skin conductance response groups for
advantageous and disadvantageous deck (error bars represent standard error of the mean).
TABLE 4 | Mean and S.D. of deck choice times for advantageous and disadvantageous decks by blocks.
Advantageous (C+D) Advantageous (A+B)
SCR− SCR+ SCR− SCR+
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
B1 3368.642 1769.784 2632.038 1425.076 2876.044 930.469 2710.814 1010.941
B2 2152.657 889.514 1826.366 892.939 2246.659 996.518 2105.207 978.937
B3 2048.194 862.381 1741.432 717.125 2058.854 925.146 2022.747 916.060
B4 1875.548 708.558 1643.454 697.875 2033.633 878.071 1741.174 684.998
B5 1931.274 741.325 1593.584 604.072 1998.761 689.776 1667.924 645.841
Although the aSCR+ group prefers favorable decks, and
participants with less activation to the disadvantageous decks
select more unfavorable decks, when choices are analyzed in
detail, we observe that the aSCR+ group prefers D, B, and C,
ordered from highest to lowest preference. This means that these
individuals could not establish B as a deck involving long-term
losses (probably because they are focused on the frequency of
the losses, which is one per 10 cards). This effect has been
previously described in studies with non-clinical samples (e.g.,
Lin et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2014), and it underlines the importance
of analyzing all four decks (ABCD), as argued by Steingroever
et al. (2013). These decision-making problems are due to the
inability to establish stimulus-reward relationships or to eradicate
previously learnt responses (Maia and McClelland, 2004; Rolls,
2004). The choices of the disadvantageous decks offer gains
at the beginning but losses in the long term. This shows that
participants either did not adequately identify the characteristics
of the decks (Fernie and Tunney, 2006; Lin et al., 2007, 2009)
or they had problems eradicating their initial preference for the
disadvantageous decks (A-B).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2237
fpsyg-10-02237 October 12, 2019 Time: 12:11 # 9
Merchán-Clavellino et al. Anticipatory Skin Conductance in IGT
Not surprisingly, the aSCR− group prefers deck B, which
may reveal hypersensitivity to reward (Bechara et al., 2002), but
the next option is for deck D, which was less expected and
would be consistent with punishment-avoidance interpretations
(González et al., 2010). This is when PVL (maximum likelihood)
parameters become useful. Analysis of the utility (α) parameter
yields α-values near 0 in the aSCR+ group, showing that these
participants are less sensitive to feedback outcomes than the
aSCR− group. Similar results have been found in other studies
(e.g., Alameda et al., 2012; Alameda-Bailén et al., 2014). However,
data from the PVL simulations do not show significant group
differences and, in both cases, the α-value denotes low sensitivity
to feedback outcomes.
Regarding consistency (c), both groups score low on MLE and
PVL-Decay, groups selects cards randomly, which is consistent
with previous findings by Fridberg et al. (2010), although
these authors focused on a different group comparison. The
group differences are more evident in maximum likelihood
than in simulation data but, in this case, the c values of both
groups are similar.
Both groups are more sensitive to losses than to gains,
although λ-values are higher with maximum likelihood than
with PVL-Decay simulation. Finally, we observed the greatest
difference between the maximum likelihood data and the
simulation data in parameter A, which had lower values with
no significant differences in the former and values close to 1
with significant group differences in the latter, and, although both
groups grant more weight to recent outcomes.
CONCLUSION
Summing-up, regardless of using unlimited inter-trial intervals,
our results suggest that aSRCs to disadvantageous decks are
indicating a somatic marker that guides the decision-making
process toward more favorable choices, leading to a better score
on the IGT. Furthermore, even in healthy participants, the
decision-making process is qualitatively different in people who
are well equipped to develop somatic markers (aSCR+) from
people who are not (aSCR−). According to the PVL model
parameters, decisions of participants who do not benefit from
aSCRs to the disadvantageous decks are more random, and show
low sensitivity to feedback outcomes. These findings are relevant
for researchers using the IGT, as they highlight the potential
effects of individual aSCR differences even in healthy control
groups, and the failure to control for these differences, or at least
to consider them in the data analysis, may lead to inaccurate
behavioral results.
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